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ONLINE SHOPPING: BUY ONE, LOSE LEGAL RIGHTS FOR
FREE
Laura Cicirelli*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet allows consumers to purchase goods from the
comfort of their homes without setting foot inside a traditional brickand-mortar store.1 While online consumers enjoy the conveniences of
online shopping, problems can arise involving the relatively new legal
sphere of online contracting. Although consumers obtain goods or
electronic information (e.g., music downloads or digital applications)
via online purchases, they also lose certain legal rights by entering into
retailers’ online agreements.2 State contract law governs online
contracting3 and requires an online consumer’s assent to an online
retailer’s agreement terms.4 Online retailers have the burden of proof
to show that the consumer had actual or constructive knowledge of the
terms—a difficult standard to meet.5
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., summa cum laude,
2013, University of Scranton. I would like to express my gratitude to my faculty advisor,
Dean Charles Sullivan, for his guidance and support in the writing of this Comment.
I would also like to thank my family and friends for their never-ending love and
support.
1
See Shelly Banjo & Drew Fitzgerald, Stores Confront New World of Reduced Shopper
Traffic, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2014, 9:38 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304419104579325100372435802.
2
See generally Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 55 (discussing the potential loss of one’s right to trial
by jury through arbitration agreements).
3
See Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 36 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[I]ssues of contract . . . are nearly always governed by state law.”).
4
Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 789–90 (N.D. Ill.
2011).
5
There is a difference between constructive knowledge and constructive notice.
In cases lacking actual knowledge, courts consider the various circumstances of a given
case to find constructive notice. Courts have used a finding of constructive notice of
a browse-wrap agreement’s terms and conditions to justify a finding of constructive
knowledge in these online contracting cases. To find a particular online agreement
enforceable, assent by the parties must be determined by actual knowledge, or more
commonly, the finding of such constructive knowledge of the agreement’s terms and
conditions. See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014)
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The United States Constitution,6 as well as many state
constitutions,7 preserves the right to a civil jury trial unless properly
waived. As court dockets have become increasingly populated,
mandatory arbitration provisions have helped ease docket caseloads.8
The United States Supreme Court has persistently upheld the
enforceability of such provisions through its broad interpretation of
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).9 As a result, many online retailers
now include arbitration provisions in their online agreements because
of the benefits they provide to online retailers.10 Despite the Supreme
Court’s strong stance regarding the enforceability of such provisions,11
courts will not enforce them without the consumer’s actual or
constructive knowledge of the agreement’s terms.12 This requirement
has led many courts to consider the presence of actual or constructive
knowledge in online contracting cases, especially in the online
retailing context.13
This Comment will demonstrate how most online consumers have
neither actual nor constructive knowledge of online browse-wrap
agreements’ terms. By adopting the reasoning in Specht v. Netscape
Communications Corp.,14 the leading case addressing browse-wrap
(“But where, as here, there is no evidence that the website user had actual knowledge
of the agreement, the validity of the browsewrap agreement turns on whether the
website puts a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the
contract.”); Van Tassell, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 790–91 (“[A]bsent a showing of actual
knowledge of the terms by the webpage user, the validity of a . . . contract hinges on
whether the website provided reasonable notice of the terms of the contract.”).
6
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
7
See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 19; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 9.
8
See generally Mary Dunnewold, Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Every Law
Student Should Know, STUDENT LAW., Oct. 2009, at 14.
9
Federal Arbitration Act, §§ 116 (1925).
10
See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 2.
11
See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (finding that
FAA trumps even state laws aimed at protecting consumers from unconscionable class
action waivers); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (finding that FAA
trumps conflicting state laws); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 2425 (1983) (“[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like
defense to arbitrability.”).
12
See, e.g., Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 79091
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[A]bsent a showing of actual knowledge of the terms by the webpage
user, the validity of a . . . contract hinges on whether the website provided reasonable
notice of the terms of the contract.”).
13
See generally, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014);
Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Zappos.com, Inc.,
893 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (D. Nev. 2012).
14
306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
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agreements, and evaluating empirical and psychological data of online
consumers’ tendencies,15 courts can create bright-line rules
articulating when, in the absence of actual knowledge, constructive
knowledge of an online retailer’s browse-wrap agreement exists.16 This
Comment suggests rules that state legislatures and/or states’ highest
courts can adopt to create uniformity regarding online retailers’
browse-wrap agreements.
This Comment focuses on browse-wrap agreements between
online retailers and consumers. Although its analysis reaches other
provisions within such agreements, it has special resonance for
arbitration provisions in particular; the increasing use of such
provisions and their negative effects on the naïve online consumer
make this a pertinent Comment topic. Part II discusses the world of
online contracting and its different forms. Part III provides a
background of arbitration and its increasing relevance due to the FAA.
Part IV of the Comment introduces Specht and its rationale for finding
particular browse-wrap agreements unenforceable. Part V introduces
psychological and eye-tracking studies of online consumers. The
studies presented in Part V help support the Second Circuit’s decision
in Specht. Based on the Specht court’s decision and the studies
presented in Part V, Part VI recommends rules of law for online
retailers to follow to assure consumers have constructive knowledge of
a browse-wrap agreement’s terms and conditions. Part VII concludes.
II. ONLINE CONTRACTING
Arbitration provisions not only appear in written contracts but,
now, in online contracts as well. To fully understand such a transition,
one must understand the different forms of online contracting. This
part of the Comment will briefly introduce the two main forms of
online contracting: click-wrap and browse-wrap contracts. Although
this Comment focuses on browse-wrap contracts, it explains click-wrap
contracts for comparative purposes.
A. Click-Wrap and Browse-Wrap Contracts
Click-wrap contracts and browse-wrap contracts differ in the way
a contracting party accepts contractual terms. Click-wrap agreements
15

See McMullen v. State, 714 So. 2d 368, 379 n.15 (Fla. 1998) (noting the
“establishment of the scientific respectability of psychology and its use and effect on
the law”).
16
Without these bright-line rules of law, the individual opinions of various judges
would determine users’ constructive knowledge of browse-wrap agreements, resulting
in varied and inconsistent results.
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require an online consumer to scroll through the document
containing the agreement and affirmatively indicate acceptance of its
terms in some way, usually by clicking an “I Agree” box.17 Conversely,
browse-wrap agreements require no such affirmative conduct by the
online consumer to show acknowledgement of its terms and
conditions. Instead, a consumer’s use of the retailer’s website and/or
subsequent purchases from the website are claimed to constitute
acceptance of the agreement’s terms.18 The terms of the browse-wrap
agreement, frequently available through hyperlinks labeled “Terms of
Use” or “Terms and Conditions,”19 often appear at the bottom of the
retailer’s webpage.20
B. Assent Under Both Types of Online Contracts
Both click-wrap and browse-wrap contracts often contain
arbitration provisions that online consumers enter into unknowingly.
In the eyes of the courts, the principles of contract law still apply to
online contracts.21 Under contract law, a valid contract requires a
finding of mutual assent between the parties to enter into such a
contract.22 State contract law controls the inquiry into proper assent.23
Courts assume assent to the terms of a given online agreement when
they find the online user had proper notice to the agreement’s terms.24
17

See Ty Tasker & Daryn Pakcyk, Cyber-Surfing on the High Seas of Legalese: Law and
Technology of Internet Agreements, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 79, 9596 (2008).
18
See E.K.D. ex rel. Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 894, 901 (S.D. Ill.
2012) (“Browsewrap agreements typically ‘involve a situation where notice on a website
conditions use of the site upon compliance with certain terms or conditions, which
may be included on the same page as the notice or accessible via a hyperlink.’”
(quoting Southwest Airlines v. BoardFirst L.L.C., No. 3:06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL
4823761, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007))).
19
See, e.g., DELL, infra note 73; EBAY, infra note 73.
20
Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) aff’d,
380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[W]ebsite terms and conditions of use are posted on
the website typically as a hyperlink at the bottom of the screen.”).
21
See Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 789 (N.D. Ill.
2011) (“The making of contracts over the internet ‘has not fundamentally changed
the principles of contract.’” (quoting Register.com v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d
Cir. 2004))).
22
See id. (noting the necessity of mutual assent for contracts on the Internet); see
also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (“[T]he FAA does not
require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so . . . .”).
23
See, e.g., Van Tassell, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 788 (citing Carey v. Richards Bldg. Supply
Co., 856 N.E.2d 24 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)).
24
See Dan Streeter, Into Contract’s Undiscovered Country: A Defense of Browse-Wrap
Licenses, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1363, 1388 (2002) (suggesting that if ample evidence
exists to find a potential licensee’s action to constitute assent, then any contract
formed by such assent should be enforced).
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The party wishing to enforce the arbitration agreement, or any other
provisions housed within a given online contract, must show proper
notice by either the online consumer’s: (1) actual knowledge of the
terms and conditions; or (2) constructive knowledge of the terms.25 By
requiring either actual or constructive knowledge of an online
agreement’s terms, courts seek to ensure that only those disputes that
the parties agreed to arbitrate are actually arbitrated.26
Courts have been more willing to uniformly enforce arbitration
provisions contained in click-wrap agreements as opposed to those
contained in browse-wrap agreements.27 This outcome evolved from
the reasoning that an online consumer’s affirmative act of clicking to
enter into the click-wrap agreement demonstrates actual knowledge by
the consumer of the agreement’s terms.28 With notice demonstrated
by these affirmative acts, courts need not enter into the muddied
waters of determining what exactly constitutes constructive notice. For
browse-wrap agreements, however, finding assent to an agreement’s
terms becomes more difficult.29 Although the assent analysis is the
same for the two different types of online contracts, in that both
require actual or constructive knowledge, its application for browsewrap agreements turns on the idea of constructive knowledge.30
25

See Van Tassell, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 79091.
See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 299 (2010)
(“Arbitration is strictly a matter of consent, and thus is a way to resolve those disputes—
but only those disputes—that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 17, at 90–
91 (noting that “[c]ontracts that exist in computerized format are not necessarily
unenforceable” unless there is a lack of assent).
27
See Siedle v. Nat’l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 114344
(M.D. Fla. 2002) (finding a click-wrap agreement enforceable and valid); i.Lan Sys.,
Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 33839 (D. Mass. 2002)
(recognizing the enforceability of a click-wrap agreement since the website’s user,
downloading software, “clicked on the box stating ‘I agree’”); William J. Condon, Jr.,
Note, Electronic Assent to Online Contracts: Do Courts Consistently Enforce Clickwrap
Agreements?, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 446 (2003/2004) (stating that “many federal
and state courts enforce clickwrap agreements”).
28
Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 17, at 96 (“It makes perfect sense that the frequency
of cases enforcing click-wrap agreements should generally be higher, as assent is more
clearly expressed by clicking on words or buttons indicating agreement.”).
29
See Streeter, supra note 24, at 1365 (“The key feature of browse-wrap, and the
source of its legal uncertainty, is that it does not force a potential licensee to undertake
an act that explicitly expresses an intent to enter into the license, such as clicking ‘I
agree.’”).
30
See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014) (“But
where, as here, there is no evidence that the website user had actual knowledge of the
agreement, the validity of the browsewrap agreement turns on whether the website
puts a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract.”); Be In,
Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 12–CV–03373–LHK, 2013 WL 5568706, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
26
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In analyzing an online consumer’s assent to a browse-wrap
agreement, courts first look for actual knowledge of the agreement’s
terms. Proving actual knowledge of such terms and conditions is
nearly impossible for browse-wrap agreements because this would
require the online consumer, usually the party arguing the
unenforceability of such a contract, to admit to seeing the terms and
conditions on the retailer’s website; very few online consumers would
admit to doing so when the consumer would prefer his day in court
over the decision of an arbitrator. Also, since hyperlinks at the very
bottom of retail webpages often house these agreements, very few
online consumers will likely have actual knowledge of these terms.
Although courts uniformly fail to find actual knowledge in
browse-wrap cases, the decisions pertaining to constructive knowledge
are not as uniform.31 With this lack of uniformity regarding
constructive knowledge analysis, the enforceability of online retailers’
browse-wrap agreements depends on different judges’ individual
determinations. Since the crux of the assent analysis for browse-wrap
agreements turns on a finding of constructive knowledge rather than
actual knowledge, courts need some guidance from their state
9, 2013) (“[C]ourts will refuse to enforce browsewrap arbitration provisions where
there is a failure to allege ‘facts tending to show that a user would have had actual or
constructive knowledge of the Terms and Conditions.’” (quoting Hines v. Overstock,
Inc., 380 F. App’x 22, 25 (2d Cir. 2010))); E.K.D. ex rel. Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., 885
F. Supp. 2d 894, 901 (S.D. Ill. 2012) (“Because no affirmative action is required by the
website user to agree to the terms of a contract other than his or her use of the website,
the determination of the validity of a browsewrap contract depends on whether the
user has actual or constructive knowledge of a website’s terms and conditions.”); Van
Tassell, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 79091 (“Thus, absent a showing of actual knowledge of the
terms by the webpage user, the validity of a browsewrap contract hinges on whether
the website provided reasonable notice of the terms of the contract.”).
31
Compare E.K.D. ex rel. Dawes, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 901 (finding that Facebook’s
Terms of Service (TOS) reasonably put plaintiffs on notice because the TOS “are
hyperlinked on every page accessed by a facebook.com user in underlined, blue text
that contrasts with the white background of the hyperlink”) (applying California law),
Molnar v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., No. CV 08-0542 CAS (JCx), 2008 WL 4772125, at *7
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (“[T]here is no indication from case law that defendants will
be unable as a matter of law to show that plaintiff had notice of the Terms of Use on
their website. Indeed, courts have held that a party’s use of a website may be sufficient
to give rise to an inference of assent to the Terms of Use contained therein (so called
‘browsewrap contracts’).”), Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d
1096, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“Having determined that Plaintiff is highly likely to
succeed in showing that Defendants viewed and navigated through ticketmaster.com,
the Court further concludes that Plaintiff is highly likely to succeed in showing that
Defendant received notice of the Terms of Use and assented to them by actually using
the website.”), and Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)
(“Appellant’s contention that the website terms were so inconspicuous that a
reasonably prudent internet user could not know or learn of their existence, or assent
to them without a ‘click,’ is unconvincing.”), with cases discussed infra Part IV.
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legislature or their state’s highest court to determine what legally
constitutes constructive knowledge. Such guidance would create a
uniform standard and prevent the enforceability of these agreements,
including their encompassed arbitration provisions, from being at the
mercy of different judges’ individual discretions.
III. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT
Arbitration, a form of alternative dispute resolution in which two
opposing parties agree to entrust a neutral third party to determine a
dispute’s outcome,32 has become increasingly utilized in many
different contracts through arbitration provisions. This increasing
popularity can be attributed to arbitration’s benefits, such as cost and
time savings.33 Not only do businesses engaged in arbitration benefit
from this efficiency, but they also limit their exposure to risk because
of the confidentiality that arbitration provides.34 When disputes
arbitrate, neutral third parties solve the disagreements rather than the
court system, which results in a lack of public court records. For
businesses, the ability to have disputes invisible to the public provides
an immeasurable benefit.
The benefits of arbitration have led to arbitration provisions
within a myriad of contracts of adhesion.35 Consumer products,
services, employment, and even medical contracts of adhesion have all
been littered with arbitration provisions.36 A 2008 empirical study
revealed that 76.9% of the consumer contracts studied contained
mandatory arbitration provisions,37 and, as a result of arbitration’s
32

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (9th ed. 2009).
Charles B. Craver, The Use of Non-Judicial Procedures to Resolve Employment
Discrimination Claims, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 158 (2001) (“Fair arbitral
procedures can provide a more expeditious and less expensive alternative that may
benefit workers more than judicial proceedings.”); Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 61 SMU L. REV. 519, 522 (2008) (“[A]nyone with a concern that litigation
was just too expensive and too inefficient, began to turn to arbitration as a means of
controlling litigation costs and limiting exposure.”).
34
Michael A. Satz, Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Our Legal History Demands
Balanced Reform, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 19, 34 (2007) (“The limited exposure to risk and
improved efficiency that arbitration provides for consumer-related industries are the
two primary benefits businesses derive by contracting for arbitration with
consumers.”).
35
See Pryor, supra note 33.
36
See In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 827 (N.D. Ala. 1999); Allstar Homes, Inc. v.
Waters, 711 So. 2d 924, 933 (Ala. 1997) (Cook, J., concurring) (“The reality is that
contracts containing [arbitration] provisions appear with increasing frequency in
today’s marketplace.”).
37
This empirical study looked at 26 consumer contracts and 164 non-consumer
33
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benefits listed above, this percentage will likely continue to increase.
Although the increasing use of arbitration provisions within
different industries38 allows individuals to experience arbitration’s
benefits, various disadvantages exist as well. This Comment divides
these disadvantages into two groups: (1) lack of information
disadvantages; and (2) waiving of rights disadvantages.
Arbitration can be detrimental in particular circumstances due to
the lack of notice that the absence of court documents creates for
future or current litigants. The absence of court records of prior
disputes between a company and its consumers leaves future
consumers uninformed of a company’s customer disputes. An
arbitrator may rule a certain way “without explanation of [his] reasons
and without a complete record of [his] proceedings.”39 With such a
lack of explanation and no public records of prior disputes between a
retailer and its customers, future customers lose a valuable way of
assessing the quality of a company’s business relations.
Arbitration provisions in contracts of adhesion also present a
more prevalent and frequently discussed disadvantage: the waiving of
an individual’s right to a civil jury trial. These provisions waive an
individual’s right to a civil jury trial, in certain cases, which the
Constitution’s Seventh Amendment and many individual state
constitutions establish.40 When one waives his right to a civil jury trial,
contracts. The various consumer contracts in the study were from companies listed in
Fortune magazine’s top 100 annual rankings of well-known companies within various
sectors. Some of these companies included: Cablevision, Verizon, Time Warner,
Comcast, Chase, American Express, and AT&T. The results of the empirical study
found that twenty out of twenty-six consumer contracts, or 76.9%, contained
mandatory arbitration provisions. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts,
41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 98083 (2008).
38
An empirical study looked at 167 different consumer industries using
arbitration provisions. The study broke down these industries into eight broader
categories: housing & home, rental services, transportation, health care, food &
entertainment, travel, financial, and other. In total, 161 different arbitration
provisions were collected in 2001. The study revealed that 35.4% of the different
industries had arbitration provisions within their consumer contracts. Although this
percentage seems low, the study’s data was collected over a decade ago. Surely this
test, if done today, would yield very different results. Dermaine & Hensler, supra note
2, at 60, 63.
39
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953); see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.
of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (“The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is
an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action. The change from
a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ultimate
result.”).
40
In re Knepp, 229 B.R. at 827 (“The reality that the average consumer frequently
loses his/her constitutional rights and right of access to the court when he/she buys a
car, household appliance, insurance policy, receives medical attention or gets a job
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he also waives all other derivative benefits of having his case heard
within the courts. These benefits include time for extended discovery41
and the right to subpoena witnesses to testify.42 Despite these rights
being waived, challengers often lose under the FAA when a party
claims improper waiver.43
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to reverse any longstanding
judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements and to “place
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”44
Under the FAA, courts must treat arbitration provisions as they would
any other contractual provision and not fashion rules hostile to
arbitration.45 Although the text of the FAA remains mostly unchanged
since its 1925 enactment, the same cannot be said for the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the FAA, which became vastly more powerful
from the 1950s to the present.
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 2, the “primary substantive
provision”46 of the FAA, throughout a string of cases described below.
Section 2 reads:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.47

rises as a putrid odor which is overwhelming to the body politic.”).
41
FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37.
42
FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
43
See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 670 (2001) (“When
made, such challenges have on rare occasion succeeded.”).
44
E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 288–89 (2002) (citing Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)); see also AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (“The FAA was enacted in 1925 in response
to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”).
45
H.R. REP. NO. 68–96, at 1 (1924) (“Arbitration agreements are purely matters
of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to
his agreement. He can no longer refuse to perform his contract when it becomes
disadvantageous to him. An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as
other contracts, where it belongs . . . .”).
46
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
47
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925).
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Section 2 has been broken down into two general clauses: the
“command clause” and the “savings clause.”48 The first part of § 2, the
command clause, grants courts the power to find arbitration provisions
enforceable in contracts described in § 2, while the savings clause
allows for narrow circumstances where courts can find arbitration
provisions unenforceable.49 Through a series of Supreme Court cases,
the Court has given the command clause more power while
minimizing the savings clause.
Perhaps the FAA’s most significant expansion was the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of § 2 in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co.,50 where the Court introduced what later became
known as the doctrine of severability. With the plaintiff wishing for a
court to hear the contractual dispute between the parties, the Court
found that under the FAA, “the federal court is instructed to order
arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that ‘the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply [with the arbitration
agreement] is not in issue.’”51 Before this case, it would have been
reasonable to assume that under the savings clause, instances of duress
or other contract formation issues rendered the entire contract,
including the arbitration provision, unenforceable. The doctrine of
severability announced that even when particular contract formation
problems render a contract otherwise unenforceable, the contract’s
arbitration provision may be separated and enforced by courts.52
A broader interpretation of the FAA continued in a series of cases
from 1983 to 1985. The Court expressed a newfound federal policy
favoring arbitration provisions in its Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp.53 dictum and later restated it as part of
Southland Corp. v. Keating’s54 holding. In Southland, Chief Justice
48

Arpan A. Sura & Robert A. DeRise, Conceptualizing Concepcion: The Continuing
Viability of Arbitration Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 403, 41011 (2013).
49
Id.
50
388 U.S. 395 (1967).
51
Id. at 403 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).
52
Essentially, this holding alerted lower courts and future litigants of the FAA’s
inherent power. If a party wishes to void a contract on formation defect grounds, and
the contract includes an arbitration clause, courts must send the case to arbitration
unless a party alleges a contract formation issue in the inducement of the arbitration
clause itself. Id. at 425 (finding that “[i]f there has never been any valid contract, then
there is not now and never has been anything to arbitrate”).
53
460 U.S. 1, 2425 (1983) (“[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like
defense to arbitrability.”).
54
465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a
national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a
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Burger explained that the FAA trumps any state law pertaining to
arbitration provisions under the Supremacy Clause.55 In her dissent,
Justice O’Connor argued that the 1925 Congress intended the FAA to
be procedural in nature rather than substantive and, therefore, should
not trump state law under Erie.56 Justice O’Connor’s view, however,
remains unrecognized to this day.57 The Court also found in Southland
that the FAA trumps all state laws that explicitly prohibit the use of
arbitration provisions.58
Beyond interpreting the command clause broadly, the Court has
interpreted the savings clause narrowly. It has held that the FAA
preempts state laws that: (1) outright prohibit arbitration as seen in
Southland; (2) require unequal treatment of arbitration provisions and
thus create hostility towards them;59 or (3) conflict with the FAA’s
purpose.60
This expansion of the FAA’s power spanned throughout the
1980s61 and the 1990s62 and continued to the Supreme Court’s 2011
decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.63 In Justice Scalia’s
Concepcion opinion, the Supreme Court held that § 2 of the FAA
preempts a California state law known as the Discover Bank rule,64 which
classifies “most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to
resolve by arbitration.”).
55
The Supreme Court relied on the Erie Doctrine to assert that in diversity
jurisdiction cases, federal courts apply their own procedural laws but apply state
substantive laws. If a federal law trumps a state substantive law, then the federal law
prevails. Therefore, the FAA trumps any state law on this matter. Id.; see also Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (introducing the Erie Doctrine).
56
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 2123 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
57
See Sura & DeRise, supra note 48, at 411 (“Although Section 2 does not contain
language expressly preempting state or federal law to the contrary, the Supreme Court
has long held the provision to have preemptive effect.”).
58
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 35 (finding that FAA trumps California’s Franchise
Investment Law).
59
See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (holding that a
Montana statute requiring conspicuous notice for any arbitration provision within a
contract is unenforceable because it conflicts with the FAA since the state statute
“solely” targeted arbitration provisions).
60
See Sura & DeRise, supra note 48, at 411.
61
See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614
(1985) (holding that arbitration provisions are still enforceable when the issue to be
decided by an arbitrator involves enforcement of federal law).
62
See, e.g., Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 (holding that laws specifying how arbitration
provisions must appear within contracts or any other state law regulating the use of
arbitration provisions are trumped by the FAA, and even if an arbitration provision
violates an applicable state law, the provision will still be enforced under the FAA).
63
563 U.S. 333 (2011).
64
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
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unconscionable.”65 The California Supreme Court had previously
upheld the validity of this state rule66 as applied to waivers in either
judicial or arbitral fora. Also, “§ 2’s saving clause preserves generally
applicable contract defenses.”67 Despite these two facts, however, the
Court reasoned that nothing in the FAA “suggests an intent to preserve
state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
FAA’s objectives.”68 The majority in Concepcion found that the Discover
Bank rule constituted an obstacle to arbitration and, as a result, was
trumped by the FAA. Concepcion’s holding concerns many consumers,
especially those wishing to engage in class action lawsuits, since the
Supreme Court’s current treatment of the FAA will trump certain state
laws enacted in order to protect consumers from unconscionable class
action waivers within contracts using arbitration provisions.69
This series of Supreme Court cases has allowed arbitration
provisions to make their way from business-to-business contracts,
where the contracting parties are more accustomed to these
agreements, to business-to-consumer contracts.70 With the Supreme
Court’s blessing, many well-known companies placed mandatory
arbitration provisions within their consumer contracts, including:
Verizon, Sprint, DIRECTV, AT&T, Sony, Dell, Gateway, and Toshiba.71
Also, after courts found that contracting parties could indicate
65

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 340.
The California Supreme Court previously upheld the validity of this state law in
Discover Bank. 113 P.3d at 1100. This law became known as the Discover Bank Rule.
The Rule essentially made class action waivers in certain consumer contracts under
particular circumstances unconscionable under California contract law. As a result,
these waivers fell under the savings clause of § 2.
67
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343.
68
Id.
69
Alliance for Justice, One Year Later: The Consequences of AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, JUSTICE WATCH (Apr. 27, 2012, 1:04 PM), http://afjjusticewatch.
blogspot.com/2012/04/one-year-later-consequences-of-at.html (“The Court held in
Concepcion that the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’)’s favorable treatment of
contractual arbitration clauses preempts state laws aimed at protecting consumers and
employees from unconscionable class action waivers.”); see also Myriam Gilles & Gary
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 623 (2012) (stating that Concepcion “broadly validat[ed]
arbitration provisions containing class action waivers”).
70
See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1636 (2005) (attributing the great increase of binding arbitration provisions
within consumer contracts to a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions).
71
Forced Arbitration Rogues Gallery, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/
forced-arbitration-rogues-gallery (last visited Feb. 1, 2016); see also Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding the enforceability of arbitration
provision found within the warranty brochure included with a computer purchase,
thus showing the presence of arbitration provisions in consumer goods contracts).
66
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acceptance of an agreement’s terms by mere actions rather than
necessitating a signature, companies then began to include arbitration
provisions within their online consumer contracts.72 This trend quickly
spread and explains why many popular online retailers include
arbitration provisions within their online contracting, including:
Amazon, Barnes & Nobles, Netflix, Microsoft, Groupon, eBay, and
Dell.73 These provisions allow online retailers to reap the benefits of
arbitration but at the same time pose disadvantages to the average
online consumer who lacks actual knowledge of the online contract’s
terms, including its arbitration provision.

72

See Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“We readily conclude that no signature is needed to satisfy the FAA’s written
agreement requirement.”); Genesco, Inc. v. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir.
1987) (stating that “while the [FAA] requires a writing, it does not require that the
writing be signed by the parties”); Valero Ref., Inc. v. M/T Lauberhorn, 813 F.2d 60,
64 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that “a party may be bound by an agreement to arbitrate
even in the absence of his signature”); Linea Naviera De Cabotaje, C.A. v. Mar Caribe
De Navegacion, C.A., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“While an
agreement to arbitrate must be in writing, there is no requirement that the writing be
signed.”).
73
PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 71. The arbitration provisions found on eBay’s and
Dell’s websites are listed below as examples of what arbitration provisions within these
online contracts look like. EBay’s User Agreement contains the following arbitration
provision:
You and eBay each agree that any and all disputes or claims that have
arisen or may arise between you and eBay relating in any way to or arising
out of this or previous versions of the User Agreement, your use of or
access to eBay’s Services, or any products or services sold, offered, or
purchased through eBay’s Services shall be resolved exclusively through
final and binding arbitration, rather than in court. Alternatively, you
may assert your claims in small claims court, if your claims qualify and so
long as the matter remains in such court and advances only on an
individual (non-class, non-representative) basis. The Federal Arbitration
Act governs the interpretation and enforcement of this Agreement to
Arbitrate.
eBay
User
Agreement,
EBAY,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/useragreement.html?rt=nc (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
Dell’s Consumer Terms of Sale provides the following agreement:
Dispute Resolution and Binding Arbitration. YOU AND DELL ARE
AGREEING TO GIVE UP ANY RIGHTS TO LITIGATE CLAIMS IN A
COURT OR BEFORE A JURY, OR TO PARTICIPATE IN A CLASS
ACTION OR REPRESENTATIVE ACTION WITH RESPECT TO A
CLAIM. OTHER RIGHTS THAT YOU WOULD HAVE IF YOU WENT
TO COURT MAY ALSO BE UNAVAILABLE OR MAY BE LIMITED IN
ARBITRATION.
Consumer Terms of Sale, DELL, http://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/vn/terms-of-saleconsumer (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
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IV. THE SEMINAL CASE OF SPECHT74
Case law regarding online contracts in generaly is still sparse and
rather new.75 In particular, case law revolving around browse-wrap
agreements is even newer; in fact, no court addressed the
enforceability of such agreements prior to 2000.76 The 2002 Second
Circuit case of Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,77 which some
courts have relied upon for guidance, ought to be followed by many
other courts for its constructive knowledge analysis pertaining to
browse-wrap agreements.
Specht involved a class action lawsuit by a group of online users
who downloaded free software from Netscape’s website and had their
personal information secretively obtained by Netscape when the
downloads were initiated.78 In the district court, defendant Netscape
moved to compel arbitration under its browse-wrap agreement’s
arbitration provision. The browse-wrap agreement appeared via a
hyperlink at the very bottom of the webpage. To find the hyperlink,
plaintiffs needed to scroll past an enticing “Download” button that
plaintiffs clicked to obtain the free software.79 Had plaintiffs scrolled
and clicked on this hyperlink, they would then have seen the “License
& Support Agreements” housing the arbitration provision that
Netscape wished to enforce.80
The Second Circuit denied Netscape’s motion to compel
arbitration, finding that the downloaders of the software did not assent
to the terms of the browse-wrap agreement.81 Since the downloaders
denied actual knowledge of the browse-wrap’s terms, the court needed
74

See Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 791 (N.D. Ill.
2011) (describing Specht as the “seminal browse-wrap case”).
75
See Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 17, at 8283.
76
See Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (“No
reported cases have ruled on the enforceability of a browse wrap license.”); see also
Melissa Robertson, Is Assent Still a Prerequisite For Contract Formation in Today’s E-Conomy?,
78 WASH. L. REV. 265, 26667 (2003) (“Prior to 2000, no court had addressed the
issue.”).
77
306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 23.
80
“Had plaintiffs scrolled down instead of acting on defendants’ invitation to click
on the ‘Download’ button, they would have encountered the following invitation:
‘Please review and agree to the terms of the Netscape SmartDownload software license
agreement before downloading and using the software.’” Id. The whole agreement did
not appear at the bottom of this screen, but rather the agreement’s terms were
contained in a hyperlink that directed users to the page entitled “License & Support
Agreements.” Id. at 2324. The agreement required users of the website to read its
terms and agree to them prior to downloading any software. Id. at 24.
81
Id. at 17.
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to determine whether sufficient constructive knowledge of the terms
and conditions existed. This inquiry does not consider whether a
reasonably prudent website user would have read the terms of the
agreement, but rather would have noticed their presence at all.82 In
determining constructive knowledge, the Specht court recognized that
Netscape’s online users “could not have learned of the existence of
[these] terms unless, prior to executing the download, they had
scrolled down the webpage to a screen located below the download
button.”83 The Specht court found that a reasonably prudent user would
not have scrolled past an enticing “Download” button to find the
hyperlink of the browse-wrap agreement at the bottom of Netscape’s
webpage. As a result, no constructive knowledge existed, and the
arbitration provision within Netscape’s browse-wrap agreement was
not enforced.84
Although the Specht court’s reasoning involved website users
downloading free software, the case has been applied to situations
involving online retailers and consumers.85 The Ninth Circuit recently
82

Id. at 23.
Specht, 306 F.3d at 20.
84
See id. at 31 (“We are not persuaded that a reasonably prudent offeree in these
circumstances would have known of the existence of license terms.”); see also id. at 32
(stating that in circumstances where Internet users are urged to download something
immediately by clicking a button, “a reference to the existence of license terms on a
submerged screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive
notice of those terms”).
85
Three of the main cases relying on Specht involve online retailers:
Overstock.com, United Marketing Group, and Zappos.com. In Hines v. Overstock.com,
the Second Circuit again addressed the issue of a browse-wrap agreement in a case
where plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Overstock.com after the online
retailer tried to charge a thirty-dollar “restocking fee” to its customers returning items.
380 F. App’x 22, 23 (2d Cir. 2010). The online retailer, much like Netscape in the
Specht case, asked the court to compel arbitration due to the arbitration provision
found in the online retailer’s browse-wrap agreement housed within a hyperlink at the
bottom of its webpage. Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 365
(E.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010). The Hines Court found that
neither actual knowledge of these terms and conditions nor constructive knowledge
of the terms and conditions were present; without proper assent, the arbitration
provision could not be enforced. Hines, 380 F. App’x at 24.
In Van Tassell v. United Marketing Group, plaintiff-customers brought suit against
defendants who again had arbitration provisions within browse-wrap agreements
housed in hyperlinks at the bottom of defendants’ websites. 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 770
(N.D. Ill. 2011). Just like in Overstock.com, this district court also applied Specht to an
online shopping scenario. Id. at 793.
Finally, In re Zappos.com, Inc. provides another situation where plaintiffs wished
to sue an online shoe retailer regarding their purchases through the retailer’s website.
893 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (D. Nev. 2012). To avoid a class action lawsuit, the defendant,
Zappos, moved the court to compel arbitration as a result of the arbitration provision
found in its browse-wrap agreement. The agreement could be found by clicking a
83
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applied Specht’s reasoning in analyzing the enforceability of an online
retailer’s browse-wrap agreement in Nguyen v. Barnes & Nobles, Inc.86 In
Nguyen, the plaintiff-consumer purchased a tablet from Barnes &
Nobles’ website during a sale but later found out that due to excessive
demand, the item was out of stock.87 The consumer brought a punitive
class action against the retailer alleging deceptive business practices
and false advertising, but the defendant moved to compel arbitration
under its browse-wrap agreement’s arbitration provision.88 As in Specht,
the Ninth Circuit in Nguyen looked to the conspicuousness and
placement of the hyperlink containing the browse-wrap agreement to
determine the existence of constructive notice and, therefore,
constructive knowledge of the agreement’s terms.89 The court found
no constructive notice because the online retailer made the terms of
its agreement available only by hyperlink at the bottom of its
webpage.90 Although the link was conspicuous to those who scrolled
down, the online retailer did not prompt the consumer to continue
scrolling or in any other way inform the consumer that such agreement
existed.91

hyperlink labeled “Terms of Use” on Zappos’ website. Id. at 1063. Since there was no
evidence of actual knowledge by the consumers of the browse-wrap’s terms, the court
looked to constructive knowledge. Id. at 1064. The hyperlink to the “Terms of Use”
was located between the middle and bottom of each page of the website. The
hyperlink, however, was visible only if the user scrolled down. If a consumer printed
a physical copy of the defendant’s homepage, the hyperlink would appear on the third
of four pages. Id. Also, the website did not direct a user to the hyperlink upon creating
an account, making a purchase, or logging into an existing account. Id. Based on
these findings and relying on Specht, the court found that “[n]o reasonable user would
have reason to click on the Terms of Use,” and the link is “inconspicuous, buried in
the middle to bottom of every Zappos.com webpage.” Id. Therefore, once again,
another court relied on the Specht reasoning to find a lack of constructive knowledge
of an online retailer’s browse-wrap agreement.
86
763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014).
87
Id. at 1173.
88
Id. at 1174.
89
Id. at 1177.
90
Id. at 1179.
91
Id.
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Although a series of cases92 involving the enforceability of browsewrap agreements containing arbitration provisions have relied upon
Specht, those courts have failed to explore the psychological reasoning
behind Specht. In understanding why courts should adopt Specht’s
reasoning as a rule of law93 to eliminate inconsistent results of what
constitutes constructive knowledge of a browse-wrap agreement’s
terms, courts cannot underestimate the importance of the human
psyche. Specht ought to be applied to all online retailing cases that
question the enforceability of browse-wrap agreements precisely
because psychological studies support its holding.
V. WHY STATES SHOULD RELY ON SPECHT FOR GUIDANCE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS94
A. The Power of the Impulse Buy
Cases adopting the reasoning in Specht, as well as psychological
studies involving online shoppers, both discuss that online shoppers
usually would not scroll past enticing items for sale in order to find a
hyperlink containing an online retailer’s browse-wrap agreement. A
majority of purchases made by today’s consumers, approximately
seventy-five to eighty percent, are categorized as impulse buys.95 These
92

Specht was the first of a string of both state and federal cases addressing the
enforceability of browse-wrap agreements in consumer transactions. A preliminary
draft of the Restatement of the Law Consumer Contracts claims that “out of a total of
27 cases starting with Specht in 2002 and ending with Nguyen v. Barnes & Nobles . . .
courts enforced browsewraps in all eight cases where the website included both a
prominent statement of notice and conspicuous, accessible hyperlinks to the terms.”
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 2 (AM. LAW. INST. Proposed Draft No. 1, 2014) (internal
citation omitted). Furthermore, “in all 14 cases where the website lacked both a
prominent statement of notice and conspicuous hyperlinks to the terms, courts reused
enforcement of the browsewrap for failure to provide sufficient notice.” Id.
93
Since the idea of assent, which is shown by either actual or constructive
knowledge, is an issue of state contract law, this Comment suggests that the highest
state courts look toward Specht and adopt its reasoning and the reasoning that this
Comment emphasizes. If state legislatures want to pass legislation regarding their
states’ contract laws, these legislative bodies should also consider the reasoning of
Specht and this Comment for online retailers.
94
The field of psychology and psychological studies have important implications
when dealing with law and determining the practicality of certain applications of the
law. McMullen v. State, 714 So. 2d 368, 379 n.15 (Fla. 1998) (noting the “establishment
of the scientific respectability of psychology and its use and effect on the law”).
95
See Pranjal Gupta, Shopping Impulses, Online vs. Off, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2011, 8:18
AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/12/01/save-america-shop-atwork/shopping-impulses-online-vs-off (finding impulse buying increasingly common
and resulting in up to two-thirds of all purchases); see also Veronika Svatošová,
Motivation of Online Buyer Behavior, J. COMPETITIVENESS, Sept. 2013, at 14, 21,
http://www.cjournal.cz/files/141.pdf (“Experience and global [research] show that
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impulse buys occur frequently and cost consumers large sums of
money.96 An impulse buy occurs when a consumer has a sudden urge
to buy something and acts upon that urge.97 Although not all online
shoppers visit websites with the intent to make a purchase,98 many of
these consumers ultimately give in to these impulses because of
strategies implemented by many online retailers.99 Online retailers will
place popular or sale items on their homepages in hopes of
encouraging online browsers to give in to the powerful urge of the
impulse buy. Customers will simply click on a strategically placed item
on a retailer’s website and proceed to checkout without any need of
further exploring the retailer’s site.
Traditional brick-and-mortar stores are notorious for triggering
impulse sales by using techniques such as strategically placing lowpriced items close to checkout stations. As online shopping increased
in popularity,100 online retailers quickly learned how to replicate the
only 20% of all purchases are planned, the remaining 80% are impulsive, based on
emotions.”); Brad Tuttle, Millennials Are Biggest Suckers for Selfish Impulse Buys, TIME
(Apr. 27, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/04/27/millennials-are-biggestsuckers-for-selfish-impulse-buys/ (citing finding by brand-research firm, the Integer
Group, which notes that Millennials, or those born between 1980 and 1995, are the
most likely to engage in impulse buying).
96
According to a study conducted by Npower, an organization specializing in
technological services, the average consumer spends approximately $114,293 in his
lifetime on impulse buys. The most common items that a consumer buys impulsively
include: “food, clothing, magazines, wine, books, DVDs, shoes, trips, beer, . . .
toiletries, home furnishings, music, clothes for the kids, jewelry, accessories, gadgets,
garden accessories, flowers, toys, and day trips.” Megan Pacheco, Is Impulse Buying
MVELOPES
(Sept.
3,
2013,
2:42
AM),
Destroying
Your
Finances?,
http://www.mvelopes.com/is-impulse-buying-destroying-your-finances/.
97
John LaCour, How Proper Marketing Tactics Can Attract More Impulse Buyers, DMN3
BLOG (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.dmn3.com/dmn3-blog/how-proper-marketingtactics-can-attract-more-impulse-buyers (“Impulse buying is an unplanned, spur-of-themoment action/behavior.”).
98
For example, an individual may visit different webpages to compare prices for
a particular item. See Jiafeng Li, Study: Online Shopping Behavior in t he Digital Era,
IACQUIRE BLOG (May 10, 2013), http://www.iacquire.com/blog/study-onlineshopping-behavior-in-the-digital-era (“[Thirty-nine percent] of online shoppers
strongly agree that ‘for relatively expensive items, I’ll shop at different stores to make
certain I get the best price.’”).
99
See infra Part V.B.
100
See Li, supra note 98 (“According to Forrester Research, the online retail sales
volume for the US 2012 is $231 billion. This figure is predicted to grow continually to
$370 billion in 2017. Forrester also reports that 53% of people in the US shopped
online in 2011 and it is predicted to grow to 58% in 2016 . . . .”); Tongxiao (Catherine)
Zhang et al., The Value of IT-Enabled Retailer Learning: Personalized Product
Recommendations and Customer Store Loyalty in Electronic Markets, MIS QUARTERLY, Dec.
2011, at 859, 860 (noting that according to Census Bureau of the Department of
Commerce (2008), e-commerce sales in 2007 increased by nineteen percent from 2006
to equal $136.4 billion).
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techniques used in brick-and-mortar stores by placing particular items
on homepages or on the screen displayed right before online
checkout. The phenomenon of impulse buying in brick-and-mortar
stores has quickly made its way to the online shopping industry due to
present-day
technological
advances,
especially
online
recommendation systems discussed infra.101
The concept of online impulse buying is not the only reason to
support the Specht court’s finding of no constructive notice and,
therefore, no constructive knowledge. “Eye tracking” studies show that
online consumers generally have a tendency to pay very little attention
to the bottom of a retailer’s webpage.102 Such studies use either remote
or head-mounted monitoring devices to record eye movement of a
website’s viewers.103 The eye-tracking devices then compile the results
to show researchers where online viewers looked and for how long.104
Many of these eye-tracking studies performed for online retailers
support the Specht court’s finding that online consumers are not on
constructive notice of a given provision housed at the very bottom of a
webpage. These studies show that an online consumer’s attention
trails off as the consumer begins to scroll down a webpage. According
to these studies, web users spend eighty percent of their viewing time
“above the fold,” meaning the area of the webpage visible to viewers
without scrolling.105 Even if the online consumer does scroll “past the
fold,” he gives this area of the website only one-fourth of the attention
he gave to the area “above the fold.”106 Most browse-wrap agreements
101

See Dhanila Veena Parboteeah, A Model of Online Impulse Buying: An
Empirical Study (Aug. 2005) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Washington State
University) (on file with the Washington State University Department of Information
Systems).
102
Many marketing giants, including Nielson Norman Group, utilize these studies
in order to see exactly where online users look when viewing webpages. Many online
retailers can hire these marketing companies to learn their customers’ propensities.
Based on these studies, online retailers can place important notices or attractive items
in areas with the highest visual traffic. See KARA PERNICE & JAKOB NIELSON, NIELSON
NORMAN
GRP.,
HOW
TO
CONDUCT
EYETRACKING
STUDIES
(2014),
http://www.nngroup.com/reports/how-to-conduct-eyetracking-studies/.
103
See About Us: What is Eyetracking?, EYETRACKING, http://www.eyetracking.com/
About-Us/What-Is-Eye-Tracking (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
104
Id.
105
How People Read on the Web, CENTER FOR PARENT INFO. AND RES. (Aug. 2012),
http://www.parentcenterhub.org/repository/web-reading/. See also Neil Patel, 8
Powerful Takeaways from Eye Tracking Studies, QUICKSPROUT BLOG (Apr. 16, 2014),
http://www.quicksprout.com/2014/04/16/8-powerful-takeaways-from-eye-trackingstudies/; Jaan M. Sonberg, 19 Things We Can Learn From Numerous Heatmap Tests,
CONVERSIONXL BLOG (Jan. 3, 2013), http://conversionxl.com/19-things-we-can-learnfrom-numerous-heatmap-tests/#.
106
CENTER FOR PARENT INFO. AND RES., supra note 105.
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will be housed “below the fold” in hidden hyperlinks where consumers’
attention spans wane.107 These eye-tracking studies and other
psychological studies regarding impulse buying reveal that online
consumers will rarely view the bottom of an online retailer’s webpage,
thus supporting the Specht court’s finding of no constructive notice.
B. Online Recommendation Systems Increase the Likelihood of Impulse
Buys
Although impulse buys occur online without the use of product
recommendation systems (PRSs),108 the likelihood of an impulse buy
occurring increases exponentially when online retailers use such
systems.109 The increase of impulse buys from the use of online PRSs
comes from the fact that, as the ease of buying increases, so too does
the likelihood of an impulse buy.110 An online retailer can now use
technology to its advantage by highlighting an item in which the
consumer has shown an interest, thereby creating an easier buying
situation for that consumer; the consumer only needs to click to
purchase an item rather than navigate through a retailer’s website.111
These recommendation systems work by studying saved and
aggregated historical data of an individual consumer based on his
107

In a personal study conducted for the purpose of this Comment, the websites
of the top 2014 retailers reported by the National Retail Federation (www.nfr.com)
were analyzed. With retailers in the categories of “Leading Department Stores,” “Mass
Merchants,” “Apparel Merchants,” and “Sporting Goods Merchants,” each and every
leading retailer analyzed in these various categories had browse-wrap agreements
housed at the very bottom of their webpages. Furthermore, these browse-wraps were
not visible without scrolling to the bottom of the webpage.
108
For example, Wal-Mart and Target have offered “deals of the day” to entice
online shoppers into impulse purchases. With these deals offered as soon as an online
shopper enters the website, this entices the customer to click the item and immediately
add it to his virtual shopping cart. The online retailers do not show these items to
particular shoppers because of data collected pertaining to their prior purchase or
browsing histories, but these are simply daily deals analogous to the sale items many
brick-and-mortar stores place close to the registers. Krystina Gustafson, The Holy Grail
of Online: Getting You To Spend More, CNBC (Mar. 6, 2014, 11:03 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101461802.
109
Gupta, supra note 95 (noting that these “various online product suggestion
tools . . . may create more impulse sales”); see Wen-Yu Tsao, The Fitness of Product
Information: Evidence From Online Recommendations, INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. Feb. 2013, at 1,
1 (noting that one main reason for online retailers to use these recommendation
systems is to influence a customer’s purchasing behavior, essentially trying to cause
impulse buys).
110
Parboteeah, supra note 101, at 39 (noting the “positive relationship between the
ease of buying and impulse buying”).
111
See id. at 40 (“Personalization is another aspect of a website that enhances online
purchasing, whereby each visitor is considered as an individual and the website content
is tailored to the needs and preferences of the individual.”).
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prior activity on the retailer’s website, including prior purchases and
previously viewed products.112 These systems then employ algorithms
using this collected data to determine an individual’s potential
interests by comparing his prior activity to other visitors of the retail
website with similar tastes.113 The product recommendations appear
on a shopper’s sidebars or anywhere else in plain view for the
consumer. Some online retailers, such as Pottery Barn, take these
recommendation systems one step further by e-mailing
recommendations to consumers.114 By simply clicking on the e-mailed
image of the product sent to him by the online retailer, the consumer
will be directed to the retailer’s webpage where he can immediately
purchase that item.115 PRSs are just one of the many different
personalization tools used by online retailers to increase the likelihood
of impulse buys.116
Many online retailers, including SkyMall,117 Bluefly,118 and eBay,119
followed the pioneer of recommendation systems, Amazon,120 to make
recommendation systems “quietly ubiquitous” by 2010.121 As the use of
recommendation systems increased, so too did online retailers’ sales.
In 2012, Amazon reported that a twenty-nine percent sales increase
during its second fiscal quarter could be attributed to the company’s
use of recommendation systems that prompt consumers to make
112

See Daniel Baier & Eva Stüber, Acceptance of Recommendations To Buy in Online
Retailing, J. RETAILING & CONSUMER SERVS., May 2010, at 173, 174 (“Recommender
systems use the consumer’s saved and aggregated historical data to provide
recommendations; they register the latest navigation and consumer behavior and
consider additional information, or rather, they generate various combinations from
suitable data sources.”).
113
See Susan Gregory Thomas, Getting to Know You.com, EBSCOHOST (Nov. 15,
1999), http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=
2447180&site=ehost-live&scope=site.
114
Gustafson, supra note 108 (“Stores like Pottery Barn send recommendations
based on past purchases and encourage shoppers to pull the trigger on abandoned
digital shopping carts.”).
115
See id.
116
Within the broad category of product recommendation systems, there are
different types of recommendation systems. One of the more popular systems, for
example, is collaborate filtering. Collaborate filtering “works on the principle that the
behavior of a lot of people can be used to make educated guesses about the behavior
of a single individual.” Thomas, supra note 113.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Tsao, supra note 109.
120
See Baier & Stüber, supra note 112; see also Lev Grossman, How Computers Know
What We Want—Before We Do, TIME (May 27, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,1992403,00.html.
121
Grossman, supra note 120.
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purchases they did not originally intend to make.122
Now, online retailers can not only place popular items in front of
their visitors, but can also make sure those items have a high likelihood
of being purchased by a given visitor.123 Due to the natural human
tendency to impulse buy and the increased use of PRSs, an online
retailer’s display of products for an online consumer to click and
purchase is equally as enticing as the “Download” button in Specht.
Both the “Download” button and the online products encourage
website viewers to immediately click without scrolling further. By
clicking in both situations, the online user enters into a browse-wrap
agreement, most likely including a mandatory arbitration provision,
without having any reason to scroll down to the bottom of the
webpage.124 As a rule of law, courts ought to find constructive
knowledge lacking in these situations. Adopting the Second Circuit’s
reasoning in Specht, there is logically no constructive knowledge
because no reasonable online consumer would scroll past enticing
items for sale in order to find a hyperlink hidden at the bottom of a
webpage that contained the browse-wrap agreement.

122

JP Mangalindan, Amazon’s Recommendation Secret, FORTUNE (July 30, 2012, 11:09
AM), http://fortune.com/2012/07/30/amazons-recommendation-secret/ (“The
company reported a 29% sales increase to $12.83 billion during its second fiscal
quarter, up from $9.9 billion during the same time last year. A lot of that growth
arguably has to do with the way Amazon has integrated recommendations into nearly
every part of the purchasing process from product discovery to checkout.”).
123
See Sylvain Senecal & Jacques Nantel, The Influence of Online Product
Recommendations on Consumers’ Online Choices, J. RETAILING, Aug. 2004, at 159, 166
(noting an empirical study showing that consumers exposed to product
recommendations were more likely to make a purchase than those who were not so
exposed, concluding that “online product recommendations greatly influenced
subjects’ product choices”); Zhang et al., supra note 100, at 861 (“Personalization
technologies enable a retailer to leverage customers’ previous buying habits and
customer profile information to make automatic decisions about what data to display
to the user and how to display it.”).
124
Clicking on a product while online shopping merely places the item in a virtual
shopping cart. In completing the purchase, however, the online consumer again clicks
an enticing “Checkout” button without having to scroll down to the bottom of a
webpage to find the hyperlink housing the browse-wrap. This “Checkout” button
becomes analogous to the “Download” button in Specht. In a study conducted for
purposes of this Comment, using the top retailers of 2014 listed by the National Retail
Federation, out of the same group of retailers studied for purposes of supra note 107,
no online retailer mentioned its terms and conditions (housing the browse-wrap
agreements) in an area above the “Checkout” button.
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VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR ONLINE RETAILERS
The need to create rules of law to determine what constitutes
constructive knowledge of browse-wrap agreements, especially those
including arbitration provisions, has never been more important.
First, online shopping has steadily increased over time and sales have
been projected to reach $370 billion by 2017.125 Second, the use of
arbitration provisions within these browse-wrap agreements by online
retailers has also increased,126 leaving naïve consumers to experience
the disadvantages of mandatory arbitration.127 Although online
retailers’ browse-wrap agreements contain many provisions other than
arbitration provisions, the prevalence of arbitration provisions and the
negative consequences associated with taking a consumer’s claim out
of the court system necessitate prompt action by the courts.
This Comment first suggests a rule of law declaring browse-wrap
agreements housed within hyperlinks at the bottom of online retailers’
webpages, below enticing products for consumers to click,
unenforceable. The reasonable online consumer, triggered by a
compulsion to impulse buy, would fail to scroll to the bottom of the
webpage to put himself on notice. Next, this Comment makes
suggestions for online retailers to render their browse-wrap
agreements enforceable. These suggestions consider both an online
retailer’s desire to make sales without scaring off potential consumers
with click-wrap agreements and the importance of providing
customers with sufficient constructive knowledge.
Other legal scholars have made different suggestions regarding
how courts should treat browse-wrap agreements.128 With legal scholars
making different suggestions and without clear guidance from state
supreme courts, attorneys remain baffled over how to advise clients on
this topic.129 The most common suggestions from legal scholars
encompass two extreme and opposite approaches: (1) courts should
enforce only click-wrap agreements;130 or (2) courts should enforce all
125

See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
127
See supra Part II.A.
128
See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 76, at 265; Streeter, supra note 24, at 1363.
129
Christina L. Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in
Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279, 288 (2003) (“The shortfall in the browsewrap case law and the lack of consensus among scholars has left attorneys in a quandary
as to how to advise clients who want to rely upon—or already are relying upon—
browse-wrap agreements to contractually bind the users of their Web sites or software,
or clients who need to know whether they are bound by the terms of a Web site they
may have viewed.”).
130
See Robertson, supra note 76, at 267 (insisting that courts “enforce online
126
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browse-warp agreements, even if hidden at the bottom of a webpage.131
When applied to the online retailing industry, these two approaches
have flaws that can only be ameliorated by a middle-ground approach.
If online retailers relied only on click-wrap agreements, where
consumers need to affirmatively check a box or click an “I Agree”
button prior to entering a retailer’s webpage, consumers would likely
become frustrated. Even if this simple affirmative act takes merely
seconds to perform, consumers could become weary of an online
retailer’s policies if the retailer used a click-wrap agreement. Clickwrap agreements, an unorthodox contracting method for online
retailers,132 could possibly lead consumers to take their business
elsewhere (perhaps to an online retailer incorporated in a state
without a law requiring click-wrap agreements or even to a traditional
brick-and-mortar store). Click-wrap agreements can create a lack of
trust between the consumer and the online retailer, and a lack of trust
negatively affects online sales revenue.133 By studying over thirty of
2014’s top online retailers as reported by the National Retail
Federation, none of the online retailers used click-wrap contracts but
they all used browse-wrap contracts.134 Wanting to conform to these
industry norms, many online retailers surely would prefer browse-wrap
agreements to click-wrap agreements and would perhaps even lobby
against any state law requiring the use of click-wrap agreements.135
Similarly, an approach finding all browse-wrap agreements
enforceable would be easier to apply than a middle-ground approach,
but would be unjust for online consumers. As suggested throughout
this Comment, a browse-wrap agreement hidden at the bottom of a
retailer’s webpage does not put a reasonable consumer on notice of
the agreement’s terms. While online retailers would push for

contracts only where users have adequate notice of the terms and conditions and
affirmatively agree to be bound by such terms”).
131
See Streeter, supra note 24, at 1389 (“The distinction between browse-wrap and
other types of licenses is illogical, unnecessary, and potentially detrimental to the
future development of Internet commerce.”).
132
See supra note 107.
133
See Chih-Chien Wang et al., The Impact of Knowledge and Trust on E-Consumers’
Online Shopping Activities: An Empirical Study, J. COMPUTERS, Jan. 2009, at 11, 16 (“The
results of this empirical study revealed that trust in online shopping is positively
associated with online shopping activities.”).
134
See supra note 107.
135
Even if a state law required all of its online retailers to use click-wrap
agreements, online consumers may still be angry. Such a law in one particular state
would not prevent online retailers incorporated in other states from using browse-wrap
agreements. Such a scenario would put online retailers in the state forbidding browsewrap agreements at a supposed disadvantage over other online retailers.
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legislation implementing this theory, many consumers would be
troubled by such an act.
Both online retailers and consumers would support a middleground approach, and as a result, it must be implemented. State
legislatures and courts must also comply with the FAA,136 as well as the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.),137 in determining an approach
for dealing with online browse-wrap agreements containing arbitration
provisions. All states except Louisiana138 have adopted the U.C.C.,
including Article 2, which governs the sale of “goods.”139 Although
individual states have adopted the U.C.C. with variations made by their
state legislatures, these variations are minor, and “the similarities of all
states’ U.C.C[.] provisions . . . far outweigh the differences.”140 Since
online retailers sell movable goods, among other things, the U.C.C.
would apply to such transactions. States must be sure to abide by the
provisions of the U.C.C. when considering rules of law pertaining to
online retailers’ browse-wrap agreements.141
The middle-ground approach this Comment suggests
recommends two techniques online retailers can implement so that
courts find constructive knowledge and therefore enforce the retailers’
browse-wrap agreements. First, online retailers could place their
“Terms and Conditions” hyperlink across the top of their websites
rather than at the very bottom. Online consumers read from top to
bottom, so following the website’s homepage from top to bottom, the
reasonable customer would presumably come across this hyperlink
before being persuaded to click on and purchase the enticing items
for sale.142 This recommendation avoids the problems noted in Specht
136

All state laws must still comply with the FAA since the Supreme Court has found
that the FAA trumps state law. If these browse-wrap agreements contain arbitration
provisions, which many do, then states must make sure to comply with both the FAA
and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute over the years. See supra Part III.
137
U.C.C. (2015).
138
THOMPSON PUBL’G GRP., NATURAL GAS CONTRACTS ¶ 401.003 (1996) (“The
Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 (‘UCC’) deals with every aspect of sales of
‘goods’ . . . . The UCC has been adopted in every state but Louisiana, and the UCC is
indeed uniform, with the exception of some changes in individual states. The
similarities of all states’ UCC provisions, however, far outweigh the differences.”).
139
The U.C.C. Article 2 applies to the sale of “movable” goods. U.C.C. § 2-105(1).
Clearly, online retailers sell goods to online consumers that fit this description.
140
THOMPSON PUBL’G GRP., supra note 138.
141
See supra text accompanying note 139.
142
Studies have shown that an individual’s tendency to read from top to bottom
varies depending on the mode in which a given document is presented to the reader.
The study showed that for online reading, as opposed to face-to-face reading, readers
were more likely to read from top to bottom. Olena Kaminska & Tom Foulsham, Realworld Eye-tracking in Face-to-face, Web and SAQ Modes, ISER WORKING PAPER SERIES, June
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and highlighted through the psychological and eye-tracking studies of
this Comment, which found that no reasonable consumer would scroll
past enticing items in order to find the hyperlink at the bottom of a
webpage. Under this technique, there is no scrolling required to see
the hyperlink containing the browse-wrap agreement, and, because
reasonable consumers read from top to bottom, they would have an
opportunity to see the hyperlink prior to both placing the item within
their shopping carts and checking out.
The second recommendation of this middle-ground approach
suggests that retailers place the hyperlinks to these agreements above
the “Complete Purchase” button on their webpages.143 Again, keeping
in mind a consumer’s tendency to read from top to bottom,144 having
this hyperlink above the enticing “Complete Purchase” button would
put a reasonable online consumer on notice and therefore constitutes
constructive knowledge of the agreement’s terms prior to purchasing
an item.145
These two suggestions not only consider the reasoning of the
Specht court and the psychological analysis of online consumers
explored in this Comment, but also take into consideration the
statutory requirements of the FAA and the U.C.C. First, many of these
browse-wrap agreements contain arbitration provisions146 and
therefore must comply with the FAA since this Act trumps all state laws

2013, at 1, 11, https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/publications/workingpapers/iser/2013-07.pdf (“The reading order of response options varies much across
modes: sequential reading of response options was found dominant in SAQ mode
followed by web mode, and rather uncommon in face-to-face mode.”).
143
This second suggestion implements the reasoning from Specht as well as the
cases following Specht. Under this reasoning, the consumer has a reasonable
opportunity to see the hyperlink above an enticing button to click rather than having
to scroll past such an enticing button to find the hyperlink containing the browse-wrap
agreement.
144
Karminska & Foulsham, supra note 142, at “Non-technical summary” (“But
reading response options in order [from top to bottom] is more common in web and
paper and pencil modes than in face-to-face.”).
145
This second suggestion is very similar to what happened in Fteja v. Facebook, Inc.,
841 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). In Fteja, the court enforced a browse-wrap
agreement because right underneath the “Sign Up” button to create the account, it
clearly stated: “By clicking Sign Up, you are indicating that you have read and agree to
the Terms of Service.” Id. at 835, 841. The only difference that this Comment suggests
for online retailers is to place the hyperlink above instead of below the enticing button
that prompts a consumer to click. This recommendation stems from the psychological
findings discussed within this Comment regarding an online shopper’s eagerness to
click in order to complete an impulse buy. See supra Part V.
146
Allstar Homes v. Waters, 711 So. 2d 924, 933 (Ala. 1997) (Cook, J., concurring)
(“The reality is that contracts containing [arbitration] provisions appear with
increasing frequency in today’s marketplace.”).
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regarding arbitration provisions.147 The recommendations of this
middle-ground approach do not: (1) outright prohibit arbitration; (2)
require unequal treatment of arbitration provisions, thus creating
hostility towards them; or (3) conflict with the FAA’s purpose.148 Under
these three circumstances, the Supreme Court has found state laws
unenforceable, but because the two recommendations of this
Comment do not violate these three requirements, the FAA should not
trump state laws adopting these two suggested approaches.
The recommendations of this middle-ground approach must also
comply with Article 2 of the U.C.C. because online retailers often sell
movable goods. For online retailers to be sure that a court does not
find its hyperlinks containing the terms of a browse-wrap agreement
unenforceable under the U.C.C., these retailers may also want to make
sure their hyperlinks are conspicuous if the agreements themselves
contain any disclaimers of warranty.149 Although the U.C.C. does not
explicitly require this, online retailers should take the extra
precaution. “Conspicuous” has been defined as something “so written,
displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to
operate ought to have noticed it.”150 This definition, however, still
leaves ambiguity for individual courts to decide what exactly
constitutes conspicuousness in a particular situation.151 In order to be
safe, online retailers ought to have the hyperlinks to agreements
containing disclaimers of warranty (regardless of a hyperlink’s
placement on a retailer’s webpage), and not just the disclaimers found
within the terms of the agreements, underlined and in blue capital
letters to indicate the presence of a hyperlink.152

147

See generally Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
148
See Sura & DeRise, supra note 60.
149
Section 2-316 of the U.C.C. provides that in order for a retailer to disclaim any
implied warranties for the goods sold under a given contract, such a disclaimer must
be “conspicuous.” These browse-wrap agreements may contain disclaimers but even if
they do not, being conspicuous would be a good protective measure that online
retailers can take in order to make sure that under the FAA, as well as the U.C.C.,
courts will enforce their browse-wrap agreements’ terms. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (2015); see
also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 92, § 5.
150
U.C.C. §1-201(b)(10).
151
Id.
152
See Gemma Fitzsimmons et al., On Measuring the Impact of Hyperlinks on Reading,
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON (2013), http://www.gemmafitzsimmons.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/On_Measuring_the_Impact_of_Hyperlinks_on_Reading
2013.pdf (“Displaying hyperlinks in blue has become part of the online culture and
most people would [recognize] a blue word on a Web page as a hyperlink.”).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit in Specht found that because no reasonable
user of Netscape’s website would scroll past an enticing “Download”
button to find the hyperlink containing Netscape’s browse-wrap
agreement, the online downloader lacked constructive knowledge of
the agreement’s terms. As a result, the Second Circuit did not enforce
the browse-wrap agreement, including its arbitration provision. With
both actual and constructive knowledge lacking, the court held that
the parties did not assent to the terms. Notwithstanding the FAA and
its strong support by the Supreme Court, arbitration provisions cannot
be enforced without such assent.
Psychological studies regarding the predominance of impulse
buys by online shoppers in recent years and new technological
advances that further encourage impulse buys support the conclusion
that the Specht court’s decision should be applied to all online retailer
browse-wrap agreement cases. Due to the analogous nature between
an individual enticed to click a “Download” button in Specht and an
online shopper’s impulse to click on a desired item to make a purchase
without scrolling any further down a webpage, states should adopt the
reasoning in Specht for all online retailers’ browse-wrap agreements.
To prevent courts from finding a retailer’s browse-wrap agreement
unenforceable due to a lack of constructive knowledge, this Comment
recommends that online retailers either place the hyperlink
containing the browse-wrap agreement at the top of their webpages or
above their “Complete Purchase” buttons.
Although this Comment makes suggestions for state legislatures
and/or the highest courts of the states to adopt when dealing with
constructive knowledge of browse-wrap agreements, the
recommendations of this Comment are intended to apply only to
online retailers.155 The suggestions in this Comment, however, are not
limited to only online retailers’ browse-wrap agreements containing
arbitration provisions. Arbitration provisions, however, have become
increasingly popular, and most disagreements regarding browse-wrap
agreements revolve around one party wishing to find an arbitration
provision within the agreement unenforceable.156 As a result of the
155
Major reasons why this Comment focuses on online retailing websites are: (1)
because these websites are the most analogous to Specht; and (2) online shopping has
increased drastically over the past decade, contributing to the necessity of uniformity
in court decisions regarding the enforceability of these online agreements. See Banjo
& Fitzgerald, supra note 1.
156
See, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014); Hines v.
Overstock.com, Inc., 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Zappos.com, Inc., 893 F.
Supp. 2d 1058 (D. Nev. 2012).
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increased need for guidance in this area of law, this Comment focuses
on browse-wrap agreements containing arbitration agreements in
particular, but its analysis applies equally to online retailers’ browsewrap agreements without such provisions. If states adopt the
suggestions of this Comment when dealing with online retailers’
browse-wrap agreements, decisions within given jurisdictions will yield
consistent, uniform results.

